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We use a novel database to study the performance of real assets created at different 
points of an investment cycle.  Our database contains information on the construction 
year of virtually all hotels in the U.S., and performance information for the majority of 
them from 2000 to 2009.  This allows us to identify the impact of hotel investment 
booms on the performance of hotels built during those booms.  We find that, controlling 
for local (county-level) construction cycles, aggregate (U.S. level) booms do not have a 
long-term effect.  However, hotels that were built during local hotel investment booms 
underperform their peers over several decades.  We examine possible explanations for 
this long-lasting underperformance.  We find evidence consistent with the presence of 
herding.  That is, potential entrants in a local market regard the construction of a hotel as 
good news about that market and are more likely to enter themselves, but are later 
disappointed.   
1 
1  Introduction 
Many industries experience boom-bust cycles.  In some cases, the causes and consequences of a 
boom or bust are easy to identify: technological change can explain why in some industries firms 
cannibalize their own operations by investing in new, superior plants (as in the semiconductor 
industry) or product lines (megaplexes replacing multiplexes in the movie theater industry).  
Other boom-bust cycles are caused by drastic changes in regulation (U.S. railroads in the 19
th
 
century and in the 1920s).  However, many industries experience boom-bust cycles without such 
technological or regulatory changes.  What explains those cycles?  What are their consequences?  
In particular, does the timing of an investment over a cycle affect its performance?  The 
aggregate nature of existing data (reporting performance at the corporate level instead of asset-
specific performance) has so far made it hard to understand the performance of investments 
made at different points of a cycle, and thus to explore the drivers of these investment cycles. 
In this paper, we use a proprietary dataset from the U.S. hotel industry to study investment 
cycles.  This industry has the advantage of not having experienced any major technological or 
regulatory changes.  Our data set offers several advantages.  First, it includes information on the 
construction year of virtually all hotels in the U.S., along with performance information for the 
majority of them from 2000 to 2009.  This allows us to identify how the performance of hotels is 
affected if they were built at different points of a cycle. Importantly, we can measure the 
performance of individual assets, instead of having to rely on the performance of a firm that 
owns the assets.  Second, we can identify geographic “markets” (counties) for each hotel and 
therefore “local” investment cycles.  To the extent that local investment cycles do not perfectly 
vary with aggregate investment cycles, we can further identify the impact of these local cycles on 
the performance of hotels built at different points of these cycles.  Third, we have good controls 
for the hotels’ characteristics, including brands, quality segments and the type of location; and 
for the markets in which these hotels operate, including economic conditions and local 
competition.  This rich set of controls allows us to isolate the impact of investment cycles on 
performance from confounding market and property characteristics at the time we measure 
performance.  Finally, the hotel industry’s features make it a good laboratory for studying 
investment cycles.  Investments are “sunk” (a conversion of hotels to alternative uses is difficult 
and thus rare) and long-lived, so distressed asset sales do not change the industry’s capacity. 
2 
Our main focus is on the impact of both local (county-level) and aggregate (nationwide) 
investment booms on hotels’ short-term and long-term performance.  We find that hotels built 
during local investment booms underperform their peers significantly for a long time.  A one-
standard deviation increase in the number of hotels built in the same county-year reduces a 
hotel’s performance by 3-5%.  This underperformance is significant even thirty years after a 
hotel was built.   
In contrast, aggregate investment booms have a negative, but short-lived, effect on 
performance (during the first five years of operation).  Finding such a “cohort effect” is 
consistent with evidence on the underperformance of IPOs and private equity funds financed 
during “hot” periods (Ritter 1991; Gompers and Lerner 2000; Gompers et al. 2008; Kaplan and 
Schoar 2005; and Robinson and Sensoy 2011).  An interpretation in line with these earlier papers 
is that during peak times, too much capital is available and hotels are built even if they promise 
subpar returns.
1
   
However, aggregate capital inflows neither explain the effect of local investment booms on 
performance, nor the pervasiveness of the effect we find (significant for thirty years).  We 
consider two possible explanations for this pattern: within-vintage competition, and “incorrect” 
herding.  The evidence favors the herding explanation: potential entrants in a local market regard 
the construction of a hotel as good news about that market and are more likely to enter 
themselves, but are later disappointed. 
Competition at the time of entry (within-vintage competition) could have a long-lasting effect 
on the entrants’ later performance, even after controlling for the current state of competition and 
local market conditions, if hotels compete more strongly with others of a similar vintage (built in 
the same or contiguous years).  If that is the case, a sudden and large increase in supply might 
affect all hotels built in a given market for several years.  An alternative explanation is provided 
by the herding literature (starting with Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992; Banerjee, 
1992; and Welch, 1992). This literature argues that if the value of investment opportunities is 
uncertain, then firms may base their investment decisions on the decisions made recently by 
other firms.  The rationale is that those earlier decisions may reveal the information that firms 
investing earlier had available.  However, this imitating behavior can lead to “informational 
                                                 
1
  This is also consistent with a “real options” view of investments; see e.g. Grenadier (1996). 
3 
cascades,” sequences of decisions in which agents ignore their own information and imitate the 
decisions of others.  Cascades are costly if several agents imitate earlier decisions to invest, 
while they would not invest if all information was publicly observable (i.e., “incorrect” herding).  
This could imply that investments made within a cascade perform less well, on average, than 
non-herding investments.  If imitators plan their projects badly or can only choose from inferior 
sites, then their performance should be even worse. 
We perform several empirical tests to distinguish between the within-vintage competition 
and herding hypotheses.  First, we broaden the definition of “vintage” by including hotels built 
(in the same county) in the year before and the year after a given hotel was built.  If within-
vintage competition explained the underperformance we find, then we should find that a hotel is 
also negatively affected by the number of entrants in its market one year before and one year 
after its entry, because all these hotels are of a similar vintage.  In contrast, from a herding 
perspective, hotels built one year after and one year before a given hotel should not have the 
same effect on that hotel’s performance.  Specifically, if many hotels were built in the year 
before a given hotel was built, then that hotel might be mimicking those earlier entry decisions, 
causing underperformance; while the number of hotels built in the year after a given hotel was 
built are unlikely to have affected that hotel’s earlier decision (except for the anticipation of 
additional short-term competition). 
We find that the number of entrants in the years before and after a hotel was built have a 
negative impact on the hotel’s performance during the first 10 years of the hotel’s operations. 
This suggests that within-vintage competition can indeed explain some of our short-term results 
(consistent with, e.g., Hoberg and Phillips, 2010).  However, we also find evidence that 
competition alone cannot explain: The number of entrants in the year before a hotel was built has 
a much more long-lasting negative impact on the hotel’s performance than the number of hotels 
built in the year after a hotel was built.  The former effect lasts for up to 30 years, while the latter 
effect vanishes after 10 years of operations.  The fact that the effect of entry in the year before a 
hotel was built is longer-lasting is consistent with herding: The decision to build a hotel was 
likely influenced by prior decisions to build hotels, potentially leading to an “incorrect” 
informational cascade. 
4 
To further differentiate competition from herding, we distinguish hotels by quality segment 
when counting the number of same-year entrants.
2
  Intuitively, competition among hotels of the 
same vintage should be more relevant for hotels that operate in the same segment (i.e., targeting 
the same type of customers).  Distinguishing within-segment from between-segment entrants 
may also help identify herding:  An opportunity to enter a market exists if hotels from a different 
segment are entering, suggesting that a market has potential, although the market might only 
have good potential for a particular quality segment, and not for others.  In this case, between-
segment imitation may be a symptom of “incorrect” herding. 
We find that the number of same-segment entrants has no significant effect on performance 
of a given hotel in its later years of operation, while the number of different-segment entrants has 
a significant and negative effect.  This evidence favors herding over competition.  However, 
competition is not completely irrelevant: It explains the coefficients for the number of 
competitors in the years in which performance is measured, as opposed to the number of hotels 
built in a market in the same year.  The evidence on current competition is consistent with an 
“agglomeration” effect:  A hotel’s performance is better if more of its competitors operate in 
different quality segments, while it is worse if more of its competitors operate in the same 
segment (see Freedman and Kosová 2012 and Canina et. al 2005). 
To confirm that our results are not driven by unobserved between-county variation, we look 
for evidence of herding within the counties that experience at least one spike of local hotel 
construction. We find that hotels built during local cycle peaks underperform their peers within 
the same county, confirming our herding interpretation and ruling out alternative explanations 
based on cross-county differences. 
Finally, to better understand what role herding plays in investment cycles, we study the 
determinants of the number of hotels built in a county-year.  We find that the likelihood of 
multiple hotel entry increases with the number of entrants in the preceding year, even after 
controlling for the county’s economic conditions and the stock of hotels in the county.  This 
effect is stronger in counties experiencing more volatile economic growth.  These results are 
                                                 
2
  There are 6 possible quality segments: Luxury/Upper-Upscale, Upscale, Midscale with food and beverage, 
Midscale without food and beverage, Economy and Independent.  See Table 1, Panel E for more details. 
5 
consistent with the predictions of herding models: With less reliable information on the value of 
entering, an agent is more tempted to rely more on other agents’ information and join a herd. 
Our interpretation of the results is the following: There are several reasons for entering a 
market, some justifying imitation, others not.  A market may have great promise, for example, 
because the local economy is growing and more business or leisure travel is expected.  
Alternatively, a hotel operator may have identified an unusually promising site for a hotel in an 
otherwise unremarkable market.  For example, a convention center may need an anchor hotel, 
but there is space for only one anchor hotel; or there may be a site with high traffic, but the 
available space is limited, so the remaining nearby sites may be less attractive.  A first hotel may 
be built either because the market has great promise, or because an unusual site has been 
identified.  If other hotel operators discover that a hotel will be built in that market, they may 
infer that the market has great promise, and a herd develops, even if the true reason was an 
unusual site.  Herders should on average perform less well than leaders in such a setup.  This 
interpretation is consistent with the general intuition provided by the herding literature, although 
it is not based on any particular model.  The main reason is that herding models typically assume 
that all agents earn identical payoffs, so they do not make any predictions about expected payoffs 
(or performance) after investments are made.   
We make several contributions to the literature.  First, no other paper studies how market-
wide investment activity affects the operating performance of a real asset (here, a hotel).  
Second, unlike earlier work, we can distinguish aggregate investment cycles from investment 
cycles at the local market level, which is where an investment faces imitation and competition.  
We show that hotels built during investment booms underperform others, but the impact of 
aggregate investment booms on performance is only short-lived, while the effect of local 
investment booms is much more long-lasting.  This distinction may be relevant for other 
“booms,” for example merger waves, that the literature finds difficult to explain. 
Our results contribute to the empirical literature on herding and informational cascades.  This 
literature is quite small, given the challenges in finding detailed data to test for herding behavior.  
Moreover, most of this literature focuses on analyst ratings or investment decisions made by 
fund managers (see, e.g., Welch 2000), where an important driver of imitation are career 
6 
concerns.  Our focus is entirely on information transmission, as in our setting career concerns are 
not likely to play a role (see Section 2 for details).
3
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we describe some key features of 
the hotel industry.  In Section 3, we describe the data.  In Section 4, we present our empirical 
strategy.  In Section 5, we describe our results.  Section 6 concludes. 
2  Investments and Operations in the Hotel Industry 
2.1  Investments in the Hotel Industry 
Branded hotels dominate the hotel market in the U.S., but surprisingly few hotels are actually 
owned by the company that owns the brand (e.g., Marriott International, Starwood Hotels & 
Resorts, Hilton Worldwide, Hyatt, etc.).  Instead, hotels are typically owned by individuals, 
partnerships or LLCs (limited liability companies), who either operate the hotels themselves or 
hire management companies.  Specifically, around 85% of hotels are owned by individuals, 
partnerships or LLCs, while only around 10% are owned by large corporations (see Corgel, 
Mandelbaum and Woodworth 2011).
4
  The typical investor who builds a hotel is a real estate 
developer, who selects a location, negotiates the financing and chooses the organizational form 
and brand (see below for details) while planning the project.     
The hotel industry is thus characterized by a decentralized ownership structure, with very 
small units making investments and start-up decisions.  As only a small fraction of the assets are 
owned by large corporations, there are no major concerns about bureaucracy or agency problems 
— including careers concerns — that complicate the analysis in other contexts.  In particular, at 
the planning and investment stage of a hotel, the developer holds equity in the project and thus 
has a strong incentive to make value-maximizing decisions. 
The decision to build a hotel is based on a developer’s assessment of future demand in a 
particular market.  This requires forecasts about the volume of demand for hotel services, but 
                                                 
3
 Empirical papers studying how information transmission affects performance are rare, because it is often difficult 
to measure the performance of an investment.  Kennedy (2002) is an exception. He studies whether TV networks 
imitate each others’ programming choices.  The performance of a decision is measured using TV ratings and a 
program’s time to cancellation.  There is evidence of herding and of reduced performance by herders, but the 
evidence suggests that herding could be caused by career concerns. 
4
 Investments/ownerships by hotel REITs (real estate investment funds) account only less than 2% of hotels, while 
other institutional investors (e.g. pension funds or financial institutions) represent usually less than 1% of investors.  
7 
also forecasts about the type of traveler that is expected (business, leisure, etc.).  A developer 
must choose a promising market, a promising site in that market, and identify the most promising 
quality segment (for branded hotels, the quality segment depends on the chosen brand).  Not 
surprisingly, these decisions are made under uncertainty, and hotels are planned (and 
construction starts) well before the expected increase in demand materializes.
5
   
Investments in the hotel industry are long-term and irreversible.  Developers invest large 
amounts,
6
 financed partly with bank loans (mortgages).  Once completed, hotels are long-lived:  
With occasional renovations, a hotel can be operated for several decades.  It is rare for hotels to 
be closed permanently:  According to practitioner comments, conversions (say, into offices, 
apartments or retirement homes) are extremely rare and only ½-1% of the existing stock is 
demolished per year.  Sales and bankruptcies do not change the supply of hotel rooms in a given 
market: they merely change the ownership of a hotel, and maybe the choice of brand under 
which it operates.  Not surprisingly, given the low exit rate, the entry rate in the industry is low, 
too: On average, the entry rate was 2.9% per year between 1993 and 2006, while the entry rate 
for other industries was about 10% for the same period (see Freedman and Kosová 2012).  
The time needed to plan and construct of a hotel varies, depending on the chosen quality 
segment and (related to that choice) the amenities the hotel will offer (e.g., restaurant, conference 
facilities).  Economy hotels without food or beverage service can be built in one year, but more 
upscale hotels (with more facilities) can require two to three years.  News about a planned new 
hotel becomes public during the planning stage (e.g., when permits are requested) or once the 
site clearance and construction work begins.  This implies that the decision to build a hotel can 
incorporate prior decisions to build by others — from the year before, for example — although 
the construction of these projects might not be finished.  
                                                 
5
 For example, the recently begun construction of an upscale hotel in the “NoMa” neighborhood of Washington, 
D.C., is the first investment in a large mixed-use commercial development; see "JBG launches Capitol Square with 
new hotel site," Washington Business Journal, Thursday, October 18, 2012.  The investment was started based on 
expectations that demand will materialize once the development is complete. 
6
  On a per-room basis, the total construction costs were at least $30,000 for low-tier economy hotels in 2003; for 
luxury hotels and resorts, the cost was as high as $600,000 per room; see http://www.hotel-
online.com/News/PR2003_2nd/May03_HotelWaterParkStudy.html.   
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2.2  Operations in the Hotel Industry 
The hotel developer can choose to operate the hotel independently or under a 
nationally/globally recognized brand name (e.g., Courtyard by Marriott, Hilton Garden Inns, 
etc.), belonging to a large corporation (e.g., Marriott International, Hilton Worldwide, etc.).  The 
choice of brand is also related to the organizational form under which the hotel will operate: 
Some brands are offered to developers only through franchise agreements (e.g., Microtel, 
Travelodge) or only through management contracts (e.g., Fairmont, Four Seasons); other brands 
make no such restrictions (e.g., Courtyard by Marriott). 
Under a franchise agreement, the corporation owning the brand (the franchisor, e.g., Hilton 
Worldwide), grants to the owner/developer of a hotel (the franchisee) the right to use its brand 
name (Waldorf Astoria, Hilton, DoubleTree, Hampton Inn, etc., in the case of Hilton 
Worldwide) and to operate the hotel under this brand name.  The franchisor does not manage the 
hotel property, but rather leaves most day-to-day management decisions to the franchisee.  
Under a management contract, on the other hand, the corporation owning the chosen brand is 
hired by the hotel owner/developer to manage the hotel.  Thus, the corporation owning the 
chosen brand handles day-to-day operations and all the management decisions at the given hotel.  
(Usually, the hotel’s owner cannot interfere with the operator’s management of the property). 
Both franchise agreements and management contracts tend to have long time horizons — 
usually 20 years, with renewal options — but can be terminated before the contract expires under 
certain circumstances (see Kosová and Sertsios 2012).  A consumer normally cannot tell whether 
a branded hotel is operated under a franchise agreement or a management contract.  Each brand 
targets a particular quality segment defined by the brand requirements, in terms of service and 
amenities offered. 
The operating costs of a hotel are mostly fixed costs.  To assess the operating performance of 
a hotel, the industry focuses on both the average daily rate earned per room-night sold and the 
average occupancy rate.  These two measures are combined in the industry’s key performance 
measure: “revenue per available room” (“RevPAR”), the revenue earned from all rooms on a 
9 
given day divided by the number of room-nights available on that day.
7
  A developer’s decisions 
(choice of a location, brand, quality segment and organizational form) are likely to maximize the 
performance (“RevPAR”) of hotels according to the market characteristics. 
3  Data and Aggregate Data Patterns 
3.1 Data Sources 
We utilize a unique (proprietary) dataset on the hotel industry.  This dataset combines hotel 
Census data compiled by Smith Travel Research (STR) with hotel revenue data also from STR.
8
  
The STR Census data covers around 98% of the hotel properties in the US — about 52,000 
hotels in 2009 — and represents one of the most comprehensive sources on the hotel industry 
available.  The data provides information about the state and county where the hotel is located; 
each hotel’s organizational form (company-managed, franchised, or independent); a description 
of the hotel’s location (urban, small town, suburban, etc.) and other property characteristics 
including the number of rooms, the quality segment and the year in which the property was built 
(i.e., the year in which construction ended and the hotel was first opened for operations).  In 
addition, we were also able to obtain the brand under which each hotel operates (coded 
numerically to preserve anonymity). 
The revenue database contains a decade of performance information from 2000 to 2009, 
mainly on branded hotels.  We use the key performance metric used in the hotel industry: 
monthly RevPAR (revenue per available room).  It is defined as a hotel’s monthly revenues 
divided by the number of hotel room-nights available that month.  Hotels of similar quality that 
operate within the same segment and in comparable markets, are supposed to earn similar 
RevPAR.  Higher/lower RevPAR than otherwise comparable projects is perceived in the industry 
as indication of better/worse performance. 
Since in our analysis we use the average monthly RevPAR per year, we restrict our final 
sample to those hotel-years for which we have monthly RevPAR for all 12 months in a given 
year.  Using annual averages of RevPAR helps us to smooth out outliers and avoid biases in 
performance measurement due to monthly seasonality.  Also, our analysis focuses on hotel 
                                                 
7
 See Corgel, deRoos and Fitzpatrick (2011). 
8
 STR is an independent research company that collects information about hotel properties in the U.S. and 
internationally.  We obtained access to all STR data under a strict confidentiality agreement.   
10 
properties that were built in 1940 or later, as during earlier years hotel construction patterns were 
sparse.  Our final sample consists of 219,849 hotel-year observations across 30,283 unique hotel 
properties, distributed across 2,216 counties.  Among these, about 89.4% of the annual RevPAR 
observations correspond to branded hotels that belong to 221 unique brands.  The remaining 
10.6% of observations correspond to independent hotels.  Notice that although we restrict our 
sample only to those hotels for which we have performance data, we use all hotels in the Census 
data to to construct some of our control variables (the number of hotels built in the same year as 
a given hotel, and the number of competing hotels operating in a given county-year). 
We complement the hotel data with data from the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), which provide annual information on county demographics and employment.  
These include population (from the Census Bureau’s annual population estimates), 
unemployment rate (from the BLS), median household income (from the Census Bureau), and 
the number of establishments in accommodation industry and two related industries — arts, 
recreation & entertainment, and food & beverage (all from the Census Bureau’s County Business 
Patterns data).  In our analysis, we rely on market characteristics at the county-level for two 
reasons.  First, counties represent the best available approximation to the relevant geographic 
area in which hotels interact with each other, and which consumers typically consider when 
looking for alternative lodging options around their target destination (see Freedman and 
Kosová, 2012 for a discussion).  Second, county-level data represent the lowest level of 
aggregation at which time-varying market characteristics are regularly reported for each year. 
3.2  Aggregate Investment Cycles — The Cohort Effect. 
Based on STR Census data (i.e., including all hotels in the Census, not only the ones for which 
we have performance data), Figure 1 shows the number of hotels built each year between 1940 
and 2009.  The figure clearly shows the patterns of cyclical aggregate activity (i.e., an aggregate 
cohort effect), with hotel construction sometimes above and sometimes below the long-term 
trend.  We define the cohort effect in any year h as the standardized residual from the time trend 
of the total number of hotels built nationwide in year h.  We use h to denote the year of a hotel’s 
construction, in order to later differentiate that year from the years of operation (indexed by t) 
during which we measure RevPAR and other control variables. 
11 
Specifically, to construct our measure of aggregate cohort effect we regress the total number 
of hotels built in the United States in year h, TotalHotelsh, on a time trend as follows: 
( )                                                 
Using the estimated residuals from this regression we measure cohort effect as: 
               
  
 ⁄  
where   is the sample standard deviation of êh.  The main advantage of this cohort effect 
measure is that it not only captures the annual deviations in the hotel entry from the common 
trend, but it standardizes such annual deviations by the overall variation in our sample. 
Figure 1 
The figure shows the number of hotels built each year between 1940 and 2009 using STR Census data.  The fitted 
value line shows the predicted values from the regression:                             
 
Although our main measure of the aggregate cohort effect is detrended, we also provide an 
alternative measure without detrending, which we use to assess the robustness of our results:   
              (      )               
Since our analysis uses disaggregated hotel-level data, we measure the aggregate cohort effect 
(both detrended and levels) for each hotel i, based on the year h in which hotel i was built. 
As Figure 1 shows, the mid-1980s and late 1990s experienced the largest spikes in hotel 
construction when compared with the time trend (i.e., a positive estimated residual and a large 
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standardized error), while the early 1990s and mid-2000s experienced slow investment (i.e., a 
negative estimated residual and a large standardized error).  The Cohort Effect reached its 
maximum in 1998, when the total number of hotels built was 2.7 standard deviations above the 
long-term trend, and its minimum in 2004, when the number of hotels built was 2.1 standard 
deviations below the long-term trend. 
3.3  Local Investment Cycles — The County Entry Effect 
Since we have detailed data on hotel entry at the county-year level, we can distinguish the impact 
of aggregate hotel entry (i.e., the aggregate cohort effect) from local market/county entry effect.  
To identify the local investment cycles that each hotel i faces in its county c at the year of 
construction h, we define Entrantsich as the number of hotels that were built in county c during 
the same year h as hotel i, including hotel i itself.  If hotel i is the only hotel built in county c in 
year h, the value of Entrantsich equals 1.  The highest value of this variable (47 hotels) appears in 
our sample in Maricopa County, Arizona, in 1998.  Thus all hotels that were built in Maricopa 
County in 1998 will have value of Entrantsich set to 47. 
Figure 2 shows the county entry patterns for four counties.  Panels A and B show the entry 
patterns for two counties that experienced large spikes in terms of the number of entrants in a 
single year: Maricopa County in Arizona and Harris County in Texas.  Panels C and D show the 
entry patterns for two counties for which the extent of entry was much smaller: Middlesex 
County in New Jersey and DeKalb County in Georgia.  The figures indicate that although entry 
patterns within counties tend to follow the aggregate investment cycles, there is substantial 
variation across counties in terms of the timing and the magnitude of entry.  As we show below, 
this substantial between-county variation appears to be a key driver of long-term hotel 
performance. 
3.4  Summary Statistics 
Table 1, Panel A, shows the summary statistics of our data.  The panel itself is divided into 3 
parts, showing descriptive statistics on: Hotel Characteristics, County (Market) Characteristics, 
and Year of Construction Characteristics. 
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Figure 2 
Panels A and B show the entry patterns in two counties that experienced large spikes in terms of the number of 
entrants in a single year: Maricopa County in Arizona and Harris County in Texas.  Panels C and D on the other 
hand show the entry patterns for two counties for which the extent of entry was much smaller: Middlesex County in 
New Jersey and DeKalb County in Georgia. 
 
On average, a hotel in our sample has 123 rooms, generates $53 per room-night available 
(RevPAR) and total revenues of nearly $3 million per year (in 2009 US dollars).  Hotel 
performance is measured from 2000 to 2009.  Thus, hotels built before the year 2000 have 10 
years of performance data, while newer hotels have fewer performance year observations.  Hotel 
age is defined as the difference between the year of operation during our sample period (2000-
2009) and the year of the hotel’s construction, plus one.  The average age of hotels in our sample 
is 18 years.  Seventy-one percent of the hotel-year observations represent operations of 
franchisees, 18% of the hotel-year observations represent operations of company managed 
properties, and the remainder represents operations of independent hotels.  
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Regarding market characteristics, on average a hotel in our sample operates in a county with 
a median annual household income of $52,200, an unemployment rate of 5.5% and a population 
of 797,000.  The average number of hotels in a county in a year of hotel operation t  is 108 
during our sample period, while the average number of more broadly defined accommodation 
establishments (including hotels, hostels, motels, etc.) in a county is 129.  A hotel in our sample 
operates in a county with on average 394 Art, Recreation and Entertainment Establishments and 
1,487 Food and Beverage Establishments. Counties with more establishments in these hotel-
related industries are likely to be more attractive tourist/business destinations and have thus 
higher demand for hotels as well.   
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the variables in our sample — split into Hotel Characteristics, County 
(Market) Characteristics, and Year of Construction Characteristics — across 219,849 hotel-year observations in our 
sample for 30,283 hotels during 2000-2009.  Panel B shows the distribution of observations (as well as hotels) in our 
sample with different numbers of Entrants, i.e., hotels entering in the same county-year as a given hotel.  The 
remaining panels show the distribution of hotels and RevPAR observations per year (Panel C); the distribution 
across different location types (Panel D); and the distribution across different quality segments (Panel E). 
Variable Mean Pctile 10 Pctile 50 Pctile 90 sd N
Hotel Characteristics
RevPAR 53 22.9 45.7 89.7 35 219,849
Rooms 123 50 97 216 117 219,849
Yearly Revenues (000) 2,937.1 537.9 1,468.9 5,787.2 5,826.7 219,849
Year 2005 2001 2005 2009 3 219,849
Age 18 4 15 36 12 219,849
Franchise 0.71 0 1 1 0.45 219,849
Company Managed 0.18 0 0 1 0.39 219,849
County (Market) Characteristics
Income (000) 52.2 38.5 49.7 69.8 12.8 219,849
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.5 3.3 5.0 8.2 2.1 219,849
Population(000) 797 37.5 295 1,804 1,458 219,849
Hotels in County 108 9 54 273 152 219,849
Art, Recreation and Entertainment Establishments 394 13 116 682 1,288 219,849
Food and Beverage Establishments 1,487 63 578 3,598 2,595 219,849
Accommodation Establishments 129 11 65 341 186 219,849
Year of Construction (h) Characteristics
Cohort Effecth 0.66 -1.10 0.66 2.43 1.27 219,849
Cohort Effecth (levels) 1,079 489 1,095 1,715 431 219,849
Entrantsch 4 1 2 10 6 219,849
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
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Entrantsch Obs Hotels % of Obs % of Hotels
1 77,780 11,083 35.4% 36.6%
2 43,463 6,075 19.8% 20.1%
3 23,746 3,331 10.8% 11.0%
4 16,889 2,230 7.7% 7.4%
5 11,379 1,570 5.2% 5.2%
>5 46,592 5,994 21.2% 19.8%
Total 219,849 30,283 100% 100%
Panel B: Distribution of Observations and Hotels
by Number of Entrants in the Same County-Year
 
Year Obs/Hotels % of total
2000 18,778 8.5%
2001 19,654 8.9%
2002 20,670 9.4%
2003 21,382 9.7%
2004 21,668 9.9%
2005 21,720 9.9%
2006 22,235 10.1%
2007 23,216 10.6%
2008 24,514 11.2%
2009 26,012 11.8%
Total 219849 / 30283 100%
Panel C: Distribution of Observations and Hotels by Year of Operation
 
 
Location Obs Hotels % of Obs % of Hotels
Urban 20,564 2,786 9.4% 9.2%
Suburban 93,756 12,350 44.3% 40.8%
Airport 14,071 1,817 6.4% 6.0%
Interstate 34,657 4,896 16.5% 16.2%
Resort 13,511 1,931 2.3% 6.4%
Small Town 43,290 6,503 23.6% 21.5%
Total 219,849 30,283 100% 100%
Panel D: Distribution of Observations and Hotels by Location Type
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Location Obs % of Obs
Luxury/ Upper Upscale 14,563 6.6%
Upscale 22,702 10.3%
Midscale with F&B 21,831 9.9%
Midscale without F&B 66,587 30.3%
Economy 70,839 32.2%
Independent 23,327 10.6%
Total 219,849 100%
Panel E: Distribution of Observations by Segment
 
Finally, at the bottom of Panel A, we present the characteristics of hotels by year of 
construction, as defined in Section 3.2: Cohort Effect, Cohort Effect (level), and Entrants.  In this 
panel, and in all subsequent tables, we show these variables with subscripts, to remind the reader 
that they have different levels of aggregation, and that both Entrants and Cohort Effect are 
measured in the year of a hotel’s construction, h, not in the year when we measure a hotel’s 
performance, t.  For simplicity, we do not include the subscripts of the other variables in the 
tables, as they are all measured at year t, although different variables have different levels of 
aggregation (i.e., county/hotel level).  As Panel A shows, the detrended measure Cohort Effect is 
positive on average, as more hotels were built during years of high investment activity than 
during years of low investment activity.  The mean for the variable Entrants is 4, indicating that 
on average a hotel in our sample was built with 3 other hotels in the same county-year. 
Panel B shows a more detailed description of the variable Entrants, which captures county 
investment cycles.  Specifically, 37% of the hotels (35% of our sample observations) represent 
hotels that were the only entrants in their year of construction in their county; while 20% of the 
hotels (20% of our observations) were built together with one other hotel in the same county and 
the same year.  Hotel-year observations with 3, 4 and 5 hotels built at the same time represent 
11%, 8% and 5% of our data, respectively.  Interestingly, more than 20% of the observations 
represent properties that were built in the same county-year with 5 or more other hotels. 
Panel C shows the annual frequency of hotel performance observations (RevPAR) in our 
sample. Overall, the distribution of hotel-year observations is relatively similar across the years 
with gradual increases over time due to new hotel construction.  Panel D shows the distribution 
of hotels in our sample across different location types (i.e., urban, suburban, small town, resort, 
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near a highway, or near an airport).  Finally, Panel E shows the distribution of observations by 
quality segment.  As expected, a small fraction (6.6%) of the hotel-observations operate in the 
Luxury/Upper-Upscale and Upscale segments, while more than 40% operate in Midscale 
segments (with and without food and beverage) and Economy segment (32%).  Independent 
hotels have no explicit quality benchmark and in our sample represent less than 11% of the 
observations. 
4  Empirical Methodology 
To analyze the impact of the aggregate investment cycles (aggregate cohort effect) and 
local/county-level investment cycles (county entry effect) on asset performance we estimate 
several variations of the following baseline empirical model:  
( )                                                               
                                                                       
The subscript i indexes hotels, t indexes the year of a hotel’s operation during our sample 
period 2000-2009, c indexes the county,  h indexes the year of a hotel’s construction, and g 
indexes a hotel’s brand.  The dependent variable yigct represents our asset performance measure 
— the average monthly RevPAR in a given year t. 
Differences in market size and economic conditions across counties and over time could 
affect hotel performance and at the same time be correlated with variables our of interest, thus 
biasing our estimates.  To control for that, we include a set of market characteristics at the 
county-level, ct, namely: the median household income, the population of the county, and the 
county unemployment rate.  In addition, we control for the total number of hotels that operate in 
a given county-year using the STR hotel Census database.  To control for the attractiveness of a 
market as a business or tourist destination, we control for the number of establishments in two 
related industries: Arts, Entertainment and Recreation and Food and Beverage, as well as number 
of establishments in the broadly defined accommodation/lodging industry (not just hotels). 
Counties with more establishments in these industries are likely to be more attractive travel 
destinations and have higher demand for hotels as well. 
Another set of important controls, i, captures hotel-specific characteristics.  These include 
the number of rooms or hotel capacity, and dummy variables for six hotel location types: urban, 
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suburban, small town, resort, near a highway, or near an airport.  We also include a set of time-
varying hotel specific controls, igct, that include a hotel’s age (we include both a linear and a 
quadratic term) and dummy variables for a hotel’s operation/organizational form — franchised, 
company-managed, or independent.
9
 The organizational form of the hotels has very little 
variation over time in our sample; on average, the yearly rate of change in organizational form is 
1.7%.  We also control for year fixed effects, μt, to capture unobserved macroeconomic shocks 
or changes in regulation that could affect hotel performance.  Finally, we control for hotel brand 
fixed effects, γg, to control for unobserved differences across brands, such as different levels of 
popularity and quality segments (quality segments are subsumed within brands so we cannot 
include segment dummies together with brand dummies).
10
  The default category is thus 
independent hotels.
11
  
Key to our identification of the aggregate cohort effect and county-level entry effect is that 
our performance and control variables are measured at time t (post-entry years of hotel 
operation), while Cohort Effect and Entrants are measured at time h (year of hotel entry).  In our 
data we have only 360 hotels/observations for which we measure their 12-month performance 
during their first year of operations (i.e., t=h), and all our results hold if we drop these 
observations from our sample. 
Using our baseline empirical specification (equation 3) we explore the impact of the 
aggregate cohort effect and county-level entry effect on hotel performance for the overall sample 
as well as for different subsamples based on the hotels’ age.  We then extend our baseline 
empirical specification by including county-level entrants in the year before and the year after a 
hotel i was built.  These extended specifications help us better understand how the dynamics of 
local cohort entry affect a hotel’s performance.  In other specifications, we further split the 
impact of local cohort entry into the impact from the “same” and “other” segments, to explore 
whether product market competition or informational concerns are more likely to explain the 
                                                 
9
 As Kosová et al. (2012) discuss, these organizational form dummies are likely endogeneous in our performance 
estimations, and thus their impact cannot be interpreted as a casual effect in our analysis (so we do not discuss them 
in the results section).  However, including them as controls in our type of analysis is very helpful as they capture (to 
us) unobserved changes in ownership and hotel organizational structure that could potentially bias the coefficients of 
interest (i.e., aggregate cohort and county entry effects).  See Stock (2010) for details. 
10
 For the same reason, we do not include parent fixed effects, as parent dummies are subsumed within brands.  For 
example, the parent company Marriott includes the brands JW Marriott, Courtyard by Marriott, etc. 
11
 Our results hold for subgroups of independent and branded hotels when analyzed separately, as  discussed below.  
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local cohort entry effect and its role in a hotel’s performance.  These specifications exploit both 
within-county and between-county variation to explain hotel performance.  To verify that 
between-county variation and thus differences in business conditions or location attractiveness 
across counties are not biasing our results, we also exploit within-county variation through 
various specifications that include county fixed effects.  We describe these additional 
specifications after discussing the baseline results. 
5  Results 
5.1  Determinants of Hotel Performance 
We show the results of our baseline regressions (equation 3) in Table 2.  In all regression we 
adjust standard errors for heteroscedasticity and county-level clusters.  Since many of our 
explanatory variables are at the county level of aggregation, un-clustered standard errors might 
be underestimated (see Moulton, 1990).  
In the first column, we only include Cohort Effect as a variable of interest; in the second 
column, we only include Entrants; and in the third column, we include both variables together.  
We find that when studying the impact of aggregate and local investment cycles separately, both 
have a negative and statistically significant impact on hotels’ long-term performance.  However, 
when we include both variables together, only Entrants, capturing local investment cycles, has a 
negative and statistically significant impact on hotel performance.  Once we control investment 
activity at the local level, the negative aggregate cohort effect tends to disappear (as we discuss 
later, the cohort effect remains significant during the first years of a hotel’s operation when we 
split the sample by hotel age). 
The results from column III are not a consequence of how the cohort effect is defined.  To 
show this, in column IV we replicate column III using our second definition of the cohort effect; 
namely, Cohort Effect (levels), finding again similar results.  
All in all, we find that local investment booms, measured as the number of entrants in a 
county-year, have a negative and strong impact on long-term hotel performance, even after 
controlling for a comprehensive set of hotel and market characteristics.  The economic 
magnitude of local investment booms is sizable:  A one-standard deviation increase in Entrants 
(6 additional hotels built in a county-year) decreases average RevPAR by about 4.8%.  As our 
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main results do not vary according to how we define the cohort effect, in the remainder of the 
paper we show only the results using our detrended measure (i.e., Cohort Effect). 
Table 2: Cohort Effect and County-Level Entry 
The table shows the results from our baseline empirical equation (3).  The dependent variable in all columns is hotel 
performance log(RevPAR) in a given year t during 2000-2009.  The variables of interest are: Cohort Effect to 
capture the impact of the aggregate investment cycles and Entrants to capture the impact of local/county-level 
investment cycles.  Entrants is measured as the number of all hotels that entered the same county c in the same year 
h as a given hotel i.  Cohort Effect in columns I and III is our detrended measure (i.e., the standardized residual from 
the time trend of the total number of hotels built in the US in year h, see Section 3.2).  Cohort Effect (levels) in 
column IV is the total number of hotels that built in US in the same year h as a given hotel i.  In all regressions, 
robust standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and county-level clusters.  Significant at: *10%, **5%, 
***1%. 
Variable log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR)
Cohort Effectih -0.0055*** 0.0018
(0.0017) (0.0017)
Entrantsich -0.0080*** -0.0081*** -0.0081***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Cohort Effectih (levels) 0.0067
(0.0063)
Log(Income) 0.2138*** 0.2132*** 0.2130*** 0.2129***
(0.0428) (0.0415) (0.0416) (0.0416)
Unemployment -0.0122*** -0.0133*** -0.0134*** -0.0134***
(0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039)
Log(Popul.) -0.1128*** -0.1079*** -0.1079*** -0.1079***
(0.0362) (0.0356) (0.0356) (0.0356)
Hotels in County 0.0000 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Log(AE&R estab.) 0.0619* 0.0517 0.0515 0.0515
(0.0355) (0.0340) (0.0340) (0.0340)
Log(F&B estab.) 0.0920** 0.0957** 0.0959** 0.0959**
(0.0382) (0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0373)
Log(Acc. estab.) 0.0161 0.0226 0.0228 0.0228
(0.0179) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0168)
Log(Rooms) -0.0562*** -0.0568*** -0.0568*** -0.0568***
(0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117)
Age -0.0133*** -0.0137*** -0.0137*** -0.0136***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Age^2 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Location Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Org. Form Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brand Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.644 0.647 0.6472 0.6472
N 219,849 219,849 219,849 219,849  
To better understand what might be driving the negative impact of local investment cycles on 
performance, we run equation (3) for different subsamples according to the hotels’ age.  We 
present these results in Table 3.  Column I shows the performance of hotels in the first 5 full 
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years of operation; column II considers hotels in their 6
th
 to 10
th
 year of operation; column III 
considers hotels in their 11
th
 to 20
th
 year of operation; column IV considers hotels in their 21
th
 to 
30
th
 year of operation; and column V considers hotels in operation for more than 30 years. 
Table 3: Cohort Effect and County-Level Entry by Hotel Age 
The table shows the results from our baseline empirical equation (3) for different subsamples based on hotels’ age.  
The dependent variable in all columns is hotel performance log(RevPAR) in a given year t during 2000-2009.  The 
variables of interest are: Cohort Effect to capture the impact of the aggregate investment cycles and Entrants to 
capture the impact of local/county-level investment cycles.  Entrants is measured as the number of all hotels that 
entered the same county c in the same year h as a given hotel i.  Cohort Effect in all columns is our detrended 
measure (i.e.  the standardized residual from the time trend of the total number of hotels built in the US in year h, 
see Section 3.2).  In all regressions, robust standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and county-level 
clusters.  Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Hotel Age
"1-5" "6-10" "11-20" "21-30" ">30"
Variable log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR)
Cohort Effectih -0.0118*** -0.0009 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0038
(0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0045) (0.0079)
Entrantsich -0.0095*** -0.0094*** -0.0057*** -0.0059** 0.0055
(0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0060)
Log(Income) 0.0818** 0.0641* 0.1993*** 0.2900*** 0.3815***
(0.0349) (0.0353) (0.0407) (0.0528) (0.0640)
Unemployment -0.0161*** -0.0221*** -0.0141*** -0.0099** -0.0083
(0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0050) (0.0055)
Log(Popul.) -0.0218 -0.0361 -0.0932*** -0.1710*** -0.1973***
(0.0400) (0.0357) (0.0316) (0.0392) (0.0457)
Hotels in County -0.0000 0.0002** 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Log(AE&R estab.) 0.0525 0.0354 0.0406 0.0666* 0.0712
(0.0375) (0.0338) (0.0294) (0.0356) (0.0457)
Log(F&B estab.) 0.0280 0.0305 0.0836** 0.1382*** 0.1728***
(0.0316) (0.0320) (0.0345) (0.0523) (0.0614)
Log(Acc. estab.) 0.0177 0.0231 0.0166 0.0304 0.0351
(0.0179) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0212) (0.0232)
Log(Rooms) 0.0137 0.0307** -0.0333** -0.0903*** -0.0645***
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0134) (0.0160) (0.0162)
Age 0.1678*** -0.0306*** -0.0028 -0.0211 -0.0050
(0.0074) (0.0079) (0.0066) (0.0137) (0.0065)
Age^2 -0.0204*** 0.0011** -0.0003 0.0003 0.0001*
(0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001)
Location Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Org. Form Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brand Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.6367 0.6706 0.6717 0.6670 0.6074
N 34,253 44,118 66,100 38,411 36,967  
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We find that both Cohort Effect and Entrants have a negative and statistically significant 
impact on the hotels’ performance during their first 5 years of operations.  However, for older 
hotels the cohort effect completely vanishes, while the effect of Entrants only decreases 
moderately through time, remaining statistically significant for all hotel ages, except for those in 
the last category (ages 31 and above).  In the Supplemental Appendix, we show that these results 
hold for subgroups of independent and branded hotels when analyzed separately; and that they 
are very similar across different quality segment hotels. 
The fact that the Cohort Effect is only short-lived (up to 5 years) suggests that the local 
markets do not remain oversupplied for long.  Thus, while capital inflows experienced by an 
industry may affect its willingness to fund low-NPV projects (Gompers and Lerner 2000; Kaplan 
and Schoar 2005), that does not seem to affect performance in the hotel industry, except in the 
short run.  This result is also consistent with a real options view of investments (see Grenadier 
1996).  Perhaps hotels took advantage of better financing terms and were constructed “earlier” 
than they would have been under normal financing conditions.  If this is the case, hotels might 
have been built when market demand was not yet high enough, and this is why they appear to 
perform worse than their peers in the short-run. 
As mentioned above, local entry booms have a pervasive impact on hotel performance.  How 
can we explain this long-lasting underperformance?  Is it caused by competition between hotels 
that entered a market together?  Or is this evidence of “herding,” i.e., are hotels built simply 
because one or two “leaders” built hotels, apparently suggesting that the market has great 
promise, but they were later disappointed?  We now try to disentangle these two alternatives.
12
 
5.2  Local Investment Cycles and Performance: Competition or Herding? 
Competition at the time of entry could have a long-lasting effect on the entrants’ long-term 
performance, even after controlling for the current state of competition and local market 
                                                 
12
 Omitted variables are unlikely to explain the long-lasting underperformance of hotels built during local 
investment booms.  An omitted variable bias can arise if local investment waves are caused by a common signal 
available to decision makers, but not to the researcher.  If that was the case, investments made during high 
investment activity periods would be indicative of long-lasting overperformance, not underperformance as we find.  
Similarly, it is unlikely that differences in the cost of building a hotel over a cycle explain the underperformance 
(say, a developer may build a hotel that promises sub-par revenue if the up-front investment is lower).  First, the 
brand-fixed effects ensure that hotels are compared with similar hotels, and thus hotels with similar construction 
costs.  Second, during a boom, construction costs should increase, not decrease.  Finally, while land purchase costs 
may be reduced if a less attractive site is chosen, that possibility is relevant only for upscale properties.  But our 
results hold for all quality segments when analyzed in separate groups (see the Supplemental Appendix).  
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conditions, if hotels compete more strongly with others of a similar vintage (built in the same or 
contiguous years).  If that is the case, a sudden and large increase in supply in a local market 
might affect hotels that were part of that large supply increase for several years. 
Herding arguments may also explain the negative impact that additional local entrants in the 
same market-year have on the long-term performance of a given hotel.  The herding literature 
argues that if the value of investment opportunities is uncertain, firms may base their investment 
decisions on decisions made recently by other firms.  The rationale is that those earlier decisions 
may reveal the information that earlier entrants had available, but this imitating behavior can 
lead to “informational cascades,” i.e., sequences of decisions in which agents ignore their own 
information and imitate the decisions of others.  Cascades are costly if several agents imitate a 
first agent’s decision, but they would not do so if all information was publicly observable.  For 
example, if a hotel is built in a certain market, others may infer that entering that market is a 
good idea, even if (unbeknownst to them) only that first site is attractive and building a hotel 
anywhere else in that market is a bad idea.  This imitating behavior could imply that investments 
made within a cascade perform less well, on average, than non-herding investments.  
Alternatively, if late participants in a herd plan their projects badly or can only choose from 
inferior sites, then their performance should be even worse.  For the same reasons, larger (more 
numerous) herds may perform worse. 
We perform several empirical tests to distinguish competition by hotels of a similar vintage 
from herding as potential explanations for the underperformance of hotels that entered 
simultaneously in a given market and year.  For the first of these tests, we add two additional 
explanatory variables to our original empirical specification: the number of hotels built in a 
county in the year before and the year after a hotel i was built.  The number of hotels that entered 
into the same market as hotel i, a year before (after) takes a value of zero if there was no entry, 
and it is equal to the lagged (forward) value of Entrants if there was entry.  We denote these 
variables as Entrantsich-1 and Entrantsich+1. 
Adding these two variables helps us test the role of within-vintage competition and separate 
it from herding.  If competition among hotels of a similar vintage were to explain the negative 
and pervasive effect that local investment booms have on hotels’ long-term performance, we 
should expect that a hotel’s performance is negatively affected by the number of entrants in its 
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market one year before and one year after, as all these hotels are of a similar vintage.   In 
contrast, from a herding perspective, more entrants in the same or preceding year should be 
related to weaker long-term performance, as this is an indication that entrants might be 
mimicking others’ behavior and, collectively, make inefficient use of the information available to 
them.  More entrants in the year after the hotel has entered, however, might indicate that the 
hotel itself might be a “leader,” and thus the entry of “followers” should have no effect in its 
decision process (aside from the expectation of additional short-term competition, if the action of 
entering  a market is informative for others).  Overall, the key difference between these 
hypotheses is whether the number of market entrants in year h+1 has no effect on hotels’ long-
term performance (herding hypothesis), or it causes hotels to underperform (competition within 
vintage hypothesis). 
We show the results of this new specification in Table 4.  In column I, we show the results 
for the whole sample.  Columns II-VI show the results for subsamples of hotels of different age 
ranges.  Column II shows the results for hotels during their first complete year of operations.  As 
mentioned in Section 4, there are 360 hotels whose operations started in January of their year of 
construction, so we have 12 month of data to compute their yearly average performance measure 
at age one.  For all other hotels, the first complete year of operation is when their age is 2.  We 
look at the impact of our variables of interest on the hotels’ first complete year of operation, as 
we want to see how hotels that preceded the entry of others were doing before the other hotels 
entered.  The other age categories are self-explanatory: 3-10; 11-20; 21-30; and >30 years. 
Using this specification, we confirm that the construction of additional hotels in the same 
county-year reduces the entrant’s long-term performance, and that this effect is long-lived 
(significant for about 30 years).  Regarding hotels that enter before others followed, their 
performance during their first complete year of operation tends to be better than the performance 
of comparable hotels located in markets where less entry occurred later.  These same hotels, 
however, underperform their peers once competitors enter; but this negative effect on 
performance is not long-lived: for hotels older than 10 years this effect vanishes.  We also find 
that higher market entry in year h-1 reduces the performance of hotels built in year h.  This 
underperformance is as long-lived as that caused by entrants in the same county-year. 
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Table 4: Entrants in a County in Years Prior to and After the Year of Construction 
The table shows the results from our empirical equation (3), augmented by two additional explanatory variables: 
Entrantsich-1 and Entrantsich+1.  The dependent variable in all columns is hotel performance log(RevPAR) in a given 
year t during 2000-2009.  Entrantsich-1 and Entrantsich+1, measure the number of hotels built in a county c in the year 
before (h-1) and the year after (h+1) a given hotel i was built.  If there was no entry in a county-year, Entrantsich-1 
and Entrantsich+1 take a value of zero.  Column I shows the results for the full sample.  Column II shows the results 
for hotels during their first complete year of operation (for some hotels it is age 1, for others age 2).  Columns III-VI 
show the results for different hotel age cohorts.  In all regressions, robust standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and county-level clusters.  Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Full First Complete
Sample Year of Operation "3-10" "11-20" "21-30" ">30"
Variable log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR)
Cohort Effectih 0.0023 0.0095 0.0007 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0038
(0.0017) (0.0184) (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0045) (0.0079)
Entrantsich -0.0043*** -0.0047* -0.0034* -0.0045** -0.0042** 0.0055
(0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0057)
Entrantsich+1 -0.0021*** 0.0077*** -0.0041*** -0.0006 -0.0000 -0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0039)
Entrantsich-1 -0.0037*** -0.0102*** -0.0052*** -0.0016 -0.0032* -0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0027) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0038)
Log(Income) 0.2132*** 0.0647* 0.0739** 0.2000*** 0.2912*** 0.3816***
(0.0413) (0.0362) (0.0337) (0.0405) (0.0525) (0.0640)
Unemployment -0.0135*** -0.0151*** -0.0203*** -0.0141*** -0.0099** -0.0083
(0.0039) (0.0054) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0050) (0.0055)
Log(Popul.) -0.1074*** -0.0197 -0.0274 -0.0929*** -0.1720*** -0.1973***
(0.0356) (0.0428) (0.0370) (0.0315) (0.0392) (0.0457)
Hotels in County 0.0002** -0.0001 0.0002*** 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Log(AE&R estab.) 0.0487 0.0562 0.0330 0.0398 0.0659* 0.0712
(0.0338) (0.0387) (0.0353) (0.0290) (0.0354) (0.0455)
Log(F&B estab.) 0.0975*** 0.0291 0.0327 0.0839** 0.1394*** 0.1728***
(0.0371) (0.0341) (0.0307) (0.0344) (0.0522) (0.0613)
Log(Acc. estab.) 0.0236 0.0154 0.0247 0.0166 0.0307 0.0351
(0.0167) (0.0193) (0.0163) (0.0158) (0.0212) (0.0232)
Log(Rooms) -0.0573*** -0.0083 0.0249* -0.0335** -0.0903*** -0.0645***
(0.0117) (0.0185) (0.0137) (0.0134) (0.0160) (0.0162)
Age -0.0138*** 5.6936*** 0.0053* -0.0025 -0.0253* -0.0050
(0.0011) (0.5354) (0.0029) (0.0065) (0.0138) (0.0065)
Age^2 0.0002*** -1.8582*** -0.0011*** -0.0003 0.0004 0.0001*
(0.0000) (0.1789) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001)
Location Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Org. Form Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brand Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.6477 0.6021 0.6645 0.6717 0.6671 0.6074
N 219,849 8,351 70,020 66,100 38,411 36,967
Hotel Age
 
Our results provide support for the competition hypothesis, but only in the short run.  A 
higher number of entrants in the year before a hotel was built does not hurt its long-term 
performance, contrary to what within-vintage competition would suggest.  The most likely 
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explanation is that excess supply in a market decreases over time as demand grows.  Another 
possible explanation is that as hotels get older, competition within vintage becomes less relevant 
for performance. 
  Our results provide evidence consistent with herding, however.  Hotels built in markets where 
many other hotels are built during the next year outperform their peers prior to that additional 
entry.  This is consistent with those hotels being “leaders,” and thus signaling that they had 
valuable private information about the attractiveness of a county or their chosen site in that 
county.  Of course, a “leader’s” entry may trigger more entry, and the added competition reduces 
the leader’s performance in the short-run.  This is also what we find: when many entrants follow, 
a hotel’s performance is reduced for a few years.  
Finally, herding models could predict that multiple entrants in the same year and the ones 
that enter the year after tend to underperform their peers for long periods, as the decision of 
“herders” and “laggards” could be influenced “incorrectly” by the decision of the “leaders.”  
Again, our evidence is consistent with this prediction. 
To further distinguish competition from herding, we modify our baseline specification in 
equation (3).  Specifically, we divide our proxy for local booms (number of entrants in a county-
year) into two mutually exclusive categories: number of hotels built in the same quality segment 
as hotel i, and number of hotels built in other segments.  For consistency, we also split our 
competition variable in the same way: number of hotels operating in the same county and year 
(in which performance is measured) as hotel i, either in the same quality segment or in other 
segments.  
The motivation for studying the impact of entrants in the same vs. other segments on long-
term performance is the following.  So far, we showed that within-vintage competition has only a 
short-lived (up to 5 years) effect on performance.  However, an upscale hotel is not likely a 
competitor for an economy hotel, so by aggregating entry across different segments we might be 
under-estimating the impact of within-vintage competition.
13
  Focusing on within-vintage 
competition within a segment may reveal that within-vintage competition has long-term effects 
on performance, after all. 
                                                 
13
 Freedman and Kosová (2012) show that competitive forces dominate among hotels of the same segments, while 
positive benefits from hotel co-location (agglomeration effects) dominate across hotels from different segments.  
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Distinguishing same-segment entrants from other entrants may also explain why hotels built 
during periods of high local investment activity tend to underperform their peers:  different-
segment imitation may be a symptom of herding.  If one or more hotels from a different segment 
are built, this can indicate market potential.  From the perspective of a potential entrant, 
however, correctly inferring market information from hotels entering in different segments is 
difficult.  It is not possible to completely disentangle whether entry is profitable only for a 
particular hotel segment or entry itself in that market is profitable.  In those cases, herding can 
lead to lower long-term performance. 
Table 5 presents the results for the specifications that use both within-segment and between-
segment Entrants and competition (Hotels in County).  Column I shows the results for the overall 
sample, and columns II-VI shows the results for subsamples of hotels of different ages. 
Regarding the differential impact of current within-segment and between-segment 
competition, we find evidence consistent with an “agglomeration” effect (Freedman and Kosová 
2012, Canina et al. 2005): A hotel’s performance is better if it has more competitors operating in 
different quality segments, due to an agglomeration externality.  However, a hotel’s performance 
is worse if there are more competitors operating in the same market segment.  These results 
highlight that contemporaneous competition and agglomeration are indeed very important in 
explaining the performance of hotels in a given year.    
The number of entrants in the same county-year (year h) and the same segment as hotel i 
does not seem to have an important impact on the hotel’s long-term performance (measured in 
year t).  The number of entrants in the same county-year but other segments as hotel i, on the 
other hand, clearly shows a significant impact on a given hotel’s long-term performance.  Hotels 
built during years in which more hotels from other segments were built in the same county tend 
to underperform their peers.  Clearly, competition within-vintage and within-segment cannot 
explain this pattern.  However, a herding interpretation in which a hotel herds with others which 
were not of the same type (“incorrect” herding) can explain this pattern. 
The evidence so far is consistent with the presence of herding:  There are pronounced local 
cycles of hotel construction, and the same-segment vs. other-segment  analysis suggests that 
hotels entering markets in which “incorrect herding” is more likely perform less well.  To verify 
that between-county variation and thus differences in business conditions or location 
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attractiveness across counties are not biasing our results, we now look for evidence of herding 
within counties. 
Table 5: Same-Segment and Other-Segment Entry and Competition 
The table shows the results from our empirical equation (3), when we split the variable of interest Entrants (and the 
control variable for competition during RevPAR years, Hotels in County at time t) between same and other segments 
as a given hotel i.  The dependent variable in all columns is hotel performance log(RevPAR) in a given year t during 
2000-2009.  Entrants (same segment) is the number of all hotels in the same segment as a given hotel i that entered 
the same county c in the same year h.  Entrants (other segments) is the number of hotels in other segments than a 
given hotel i that entered the same county c in the same year h.  Column I shows the results for the full sample.  
Columns II-VI show the results for different hotel age cohorts.  In all regressions, robust standard errors are adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity and county-level clusters.  Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Full Sample "1-5" "6-10" "11-20" "21-30" ">30"
Variable log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR)
Cohort Effectih 0.0000 -0.0142*** -0.0034 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0040
(0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0045) (0.0078)
Entrantsich (same segment) -0.0000 -0.0004 0.0016 0.0002 -0.0056 0.0108*
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0065)
Entrantsich (other segments) -0.0070*** -0.0076*** -0.0085*** -0.0053** -0.0060*** 0.0050
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0059)
Log(Income) 0.2098*** 0.0802** 0.0646* 0.1935*** 0.2908*** 0.3841***
(0.0394) (0.0333) (0.0332) (0.0385) (0.0515) (0.0618)
Unemployment -0.0160*** -0.0186*** -0.0242*** -0.0171*** -0.0123** -0.0106*
(0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0050) (0.0056)
Log(Popul.) -0.1028*** -0.0187 -0.0299 -0.0867*** -0.1678*** -0.1928***
(0.0358) (0.0387) (0.0355) (0.0316) (0.0396) (0.0458)
Hotels in County -0.0044*** -0.0044*** -0.0044*** -0.0044*** -0.0041*** -0.0047***
(same segment) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011)
Hotels in County 0.0005*** 0.0003*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(other segment) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Log(AE&R estab.) 0.0329 0.0375 0.0174 0.0208 0.0504 0.0556
(0.0329) (0.0354) (0.0325) (0.0280) (0.0341) (0.0447)
Log(F&B estab.) 0.1142*** 0.0458 0.0481 0.1023*** 0.1560*** 0.1861***
(0.0360) (0.0314) (0.0309) (0.0328) (0.0509) (0.0602)
Log(Acc. estab.) 0.0295* 0.0202 0.0271* 0.0258* 0.0373* 0.0405*
(0.0162) (0.0173) (0.0154) (0.0152) (0.0204) (0.0229)
Log(Rooms) -0.0608*** 0.0030 0.0241 -0.0362*** -0.0926*** -0.0672***
(0.0120) (0.0153) (0.0150) (0.0138) (0.0164) (0.0163)
Age -0.0134*** 0.1671*** -0.0286*** -0.0048 -0.0204 -0.0052
(0.0011) (0.0070) (0.0077) (0.0065) (0.0135) (0.0064)
Age^2 0.0002*** -0.0201*** 0.0010** -0.0003 0.0003 0.0001*
(0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001)
Location Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Org. Form Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brand Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.6514 0.642 0.6761 0.6761 0.6701
N 219,849 34,253 44,118 66,100 38,411 36,967
Hotel Age
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5.3  Within-County Herding 
As herding seems to be the most plausible explanation for the long-term underperformance of 
hotels built during high local investment cycles, we specifically design a test which attempts to 
measure the relative performance of herders within a county.  To this end, we restrict our sample 
to those counties for which there was meaningful variation in investment cyclicality.  In 
particular, we restrict our sample to counties in which five or more hotels were built in a single 
year at least once.  There are 160 counties that satisfy that criterion.  Then, we classify hotels that 
were probably part of a herd according to two different criteria.  For our first criterion, we create 
dummy variables that classify each hotel entry by deciles of same-year entry within a county, 
i.e., whether the year of entry is within the first decile of years of higher activity, the second 
decile of years of higher activity, etc.  If “herd” investments were poorly planned or executed, or 
if they were otherwise disadvantaged, we should expect hotels built during cycle peaks to 
perform the worst.    We show the results in Table 6, column I.  We include all the control 
variables from our empirical model (equation (3)) in these regressions, but we do not report them 
in the table for space reasons. 
The patterns are striking.  Hotels built during highest decile years of construction activity 
underperform peer hotels within the same county by almost 6%.  Given that these regressions 
control for county-fixed effects, this result confirms that the underperformance is not driven by 
unobserved market characteristics.  
One potential disadvantage of measuring herding using deciles of construction activity within 
a county is that we cannot distinguish between years of high investment activity that precede the 
peak year from those years that came after.  Thus, for our second classification of “herders,” we 
first define peak years and then define “herders” using those years.  We also define “leaders” and 
“laggards” relative to those years. 
We define peak years as years in which at least 5 hotels were built, which were preceded by 
non-negative growth in hotel construction and which were followed by a decline in hotel 
construction.  Using this criterion, we were able to classify 332 peak years in 159 counties.
14
  
Then, we classify hotels as “herders” (dummy variable) if they were built during a peak year in a 
  
                                                 
14
 For one county there was no year that could be classified as a peak using this criterion. 
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Table 6: Within-County Herders’ Performance 
The table shows the results for 160 counties in which 5 or more hotels built in a single year at least once.  The 
dependent variable in all columns is hotel performance log(RevPAR) in a given year t during 2000-2009.  Focusing 
on within-county variation, the regressions control for county-fixed effects and include the same controls as our 
empirical equation (3) together with our detrended measure of Cohort Effect.  However, in Column I, instead of 
including the variable Entrants (as in equation (3)), we use dummies to indicate into which County Entry Decile a 
given hotel i belongs in its year of entry h (based on overall level of entry in that county).  In Column II, instead of 
using dummies for entry deciles, we use dummies to indicate whether a given hotel i belongs to Herders (i.e., hotels 
built during peak years for a given county) or Laggards/Leaders (i.e., hotels built 3, 2 or 1 years after/before the 
peak year), based on its year of construction h and county c.  In all regressions, robust standard errors are adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity and county-level clusters.  Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Variable log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR)
Cohort Effectih 0.0027 0.0022
(0.0025) (0.0023)
County Entry Decile 2 0.0097
(0.0093)
County Entry Decile 3 0.0111
(0.0113)
County Entry Decile 4 -0.0007
(0.0102)
County Entry Decile 5 -0.0076
(0.0108)
County Entry Decile 6 -0.0010
(0.0123)
County Entry Decile 7 -0.0076
(0.0107)
County Entry Decile 8 -0.0065
(0.0128)
County Entry Decile 9 -0.0063
(0.0124)
County Entry Decile 10 -0.0592**
(0.0244)
Leadersich-3 (3 years before peak) -0.0051
(0.0074)
Leadersich-2 (2 years before peak) -0.0075
(0.0073)
Leadersich-1 (1 year before peak) -0.0079
(0.0066)
Herdersich (peak year) -0.0152**
(0.0076)
Laggardsich+1 (year after peak) -0.0135*
(0.0079)
Laggardsich+2 (year after peak) -0.0134
(0.0114)
Laggardsich+3 (year after peak) -0.0011
(0.0081)
Controls Yes Yes
Location Dummies Yes Yes
Org. Form Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Brand Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes
County Cluster Yes Yes
R-squared 0.7591 0.7607
N 102,133 100,714  
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county.  We classify hotels into 3 different “leader” categories according to whether they were 
built 3, 2, or 1 years before the peak year, and we classify hotels into 3 different “laggards” 
categories according to whether hotels were built 1, 2 or 3 years after the peak year.  Column II 
of table 6 show the performance of these hotels relative to their county peers (neither leaders, 
laggards nor herders).  Consistent with “incorrect” herding, we find that hotels built during the 
peak of the local investment cycle and hotels built one year after the peak underperform their 
peers.  Neither “leaders,” nor late “laggards” show any statistically significant difference in 
performance relative to the control group.  This is to be expected as leaders by definition do not 
take “incorrect” decisions based on other’s actions, while late “laggards” have had more time to 
observe the early performance of herders and thus make a better-informed decision about entry. 
5.4  Does Herding Drive Local Investment Cycles? 
Our results on hotels’ long-term performance show that hotels that enter the market as part of a 
herd tend to underperform their peers.  The most likely explanation for this is that “herders” put 
significant weight on others’ entry decisions when assessing the attractiveness of a county, and 
that this strategy did not pay off, on average.  To provide further evidence that herding behavior 
is the most plausible cause of the underperformance pattern that we find, we now look for 
evidence of herding behavior at the time of construction.  In particular, we study whether the 
likelihood of other hotels entering the market in a given year is affected by entry patterns in the 
prior year, even after controlling for common market signals.  In addition, we would like to test 
whether entry decisions are more likely to be dependent on previous market participants’ 
decisions when the market common signals are more volatile, as predicted by herding models. 
To address these issues, we estimate an empirical specification different from equation (3), in 
which the unit of observation is a county-year of hotel construction (c,h).  The dependent 
variable Ech is a discrete measure of the “hotel entry intensity” in given county-year, which takes 
a value of 0 if no hotel is built in a county-year (no entry), 1 if just one hotel is built (single 
entry), 2 if 2-5 hotels are built (moderate entry), and 3 if 6 or more hotels are built in a county-
year (massive entry).  We then estimate a multinomial logit model (equation (4) below) in order 
to better understand whether different levels of entry intensity (massive, moderate, single and no 
entry) in a county-year respond differently to common economic signals and prior actions (hotel 
construction) of market participants.  
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( )                                            
The county-level explanatory variables, Xch-1, are lagged one year, since the decision to build 
a hotel is likely based on information available when construction started (recall that the year h is 
the year in which a hotel was opened). In this category, we include County GDP in year h-1 (in 
logs); average county GDP growth from year h-4 to h-1 (both from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA)); the normalized standard deviation of county GDP growth from year h-4 to h-1 
(to capture the volatility of the common economic signals); the stock of existing hotels in county 
c in year h-1; the number of hotels built in county c in year h-1; and various interaction terms 
(described below) 15   
To understand the role of herding behavior, the number of hotels built in a county in the 
preceding year is of particular importance.  In the absence of herding considerations, that number 
should be irrelevant for the entry decision of other participants, once the common signals about 
economic conditions of the county are taken into account. If herding considerations play a role in 
the building decision, however, we should expect that the likelihood of multiple hotels being 
built in a county in year h is positively affected by the number of hotels built in that same county 
on year h-1. In addition, if herding is indeed playing a role in the decision to build in a county-
year, this decision should be more heavily influenced by other hotels being built the prior year 
when common county signals are less precise. To test this intuition, we include an interaction 
term between the number of hotels built in a county in the prior year and the normalized standard 
deviation of county GDP growth. We expect this coefficient to be positive. 
We also include an interaction term between the number of hotels built in the prior year and 
county GDP growth.  This term helps us test whether herding is more likely when the market is 
bullish, as documented by Welch (2000) for the case of analyst ratings.  
Finally, we control for unobserved macro factors using time fixed effects,   . Relatedly, we 
include the interaction between the spread of Aaa Bonds to Fed rates (obtained from the Saint 
Louis Fed) with county GDP growth. This interaction term helps us to control for the effect that 
favorable financing conditions conjoint with favorable real economic conditions may have on 
                                                 
15
 For parsimony, we use total income rather than income per capita and population.  All the results we present are 
robust to including these demographics separately. 
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hotel construction. In our estimation, we do not include Bonds spread itself (not interacted), as 
the spread is perfectly collinear with time-fixed effects. 
The data we use to conduct our logit analysis covers around 3,100 counties each year from 
1973-2009. The data starts in 1973 because the BEA compiles annual data on county 
demographics only since 1969, and we use four lags for county GDP growth and its standard 
deviation.  Our final sample consists of 114,908 county-year observations.  Among those, 95,261 
(82.9%) county-years register no hotels built; 13,160 (11.4%) register 1 hotel built; 5,733 (5%) 
register 2-5 hotels built; and 754 (0.7%) register 6 or more hotels built. 
We present the results from the multinomial logit estimation in Table 7.  All the control 
variables show expected results: high county GDP increases the likelihood of a single and 
multiple hotel constructions (relative to no hotel entry), and higher county GDP growth also 
increases that likelihood.  The effect of higher county GDP growth is weakened when the costs 
of financing (yield spreads) are high, especially for multiple hotel constructions in a given 
county-year.   We also find that higher county growth volatility decreases hotel construction, 
consistent with standard investment evaluation arguments (lower NPV) and real options 
arguments (benefits from delaying entry). 
The number of hotels built in a county in the previous year does not have a significant impact 
on a single hotel construction (relative to no hotel construction).  That is, entry, by itself, is not 
driven by previous participants’ actions.  Moderate and massive intensity of entry (columns 2-3), 
however, are significantly affected by the number of hotels built in the previous year. This is 
consistent with the idea that current entrants are inferring “something” about the market by 
observing the behavior of previous entrants.  This result is indicative of herding, but it can also 
be merely due to an omitted variable bias generating positive autocorrelation between entry 
decisions in current and previous years.  What is also indicative of herding, and not subject to 
this criticism, is that when the volatility of county GDP growth is high, the positive effect of 
previous market entry increases.  This increase is particularly pronounced for multiple entry. 
Of additional interest is the result that previous market entry encourages current market entry 
when the market is more bullish (county GDP growth is higher).  This is consistent with Welch’s 
(2000) finding that herding by analysts is more likely when markets are bullish. 
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Table 7: When is Herding More Likely?  (Sample 1973-2008) 
The table shows the results from a multinomial logit (equation (4)) across 3,100 US counties during 1973-2008.  
The dependent variable Ech takes a value of 0 if no hotels are built in a county-year, 1 if a single hotel is built, 2 if 2-
5 hotels are built, and 3 if 6 or more hotels are built.  As controls we include county-level economic, demographic 
and financing cost variables available for each year since 1973.  In all regressions, robust standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and county-level clusters.  Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Multinomial Logit
Entrantsch
Variable 1 vs 0 2-5 vs 0 5+ vs 0
Hotels in Countych-1 0.0162*** 0.0249*** 0.0307***
(0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0034)
Hotels Built in Countych-1 -0.0012 0.1567*** 0.3711***
(0.0403) (0.0498) (0.0665)
Log(County GDP)ch-1 0.5495*** 0.9064*** 1.4492***
(0.0174) (0.0303) (0.0986)
Mean Tot. County GDP Growthch-1 from h-4 to h-1 4.5990*** 10.7898*** 18.3985***
(0.4756) (0.7651) (1.8663)
(Mean Tot. County GDP Growthch-1 from h-4 to h-1)* -0.1298 -0.7202*** -1.0857*
(Spread Aaa Bonds to Fed rates h-1) (0.1593) (0.2405) (0.6306)
Normalized Standard Dev. County GDP Growthch-1  h-4 to h-1 -0.1290*** -0.5234*** -1.5003***
(0.0219) (0.0930) (0.3639)
(Hotels Built in Countych-1)* 1.6969** 2.2125** 5.5152***
(Normalized Standard Dev. County GDP Growthch-1  h-4 to h-1) (0.7082) (1.0024) (1.5320)
(Hotels Built in Countych-1)* 2.2051*** 3.5075*** 4.1421***
(Mean Tot. County GDP Growthch-1 from h-4 to h-1) (0.4647) (0.5602) (0.7345)
Year-Fixed Effects Yes
County Cluster Yes
"R-squared" 0.26
N 114908  
Overall, the results in Table 7 suggest that entry in a given county-year is indeed affected by 
the behavior of earlier market participants.  This reinforces the notion that herding is the most 
plausible explanation for our previous findings. 
6  Conclusion 
In this paper, we use a proprietary dataset from the U.S. hotel industry to study investment cycles 
and the impact of the timing of an investment over a cycle on that investment’s performance.  
The evidence we have presented in this paper is intriguing.  Why are hotels built in cycles at the 
local level?  And why do hotels built during booms underperform others for decades?  Our 
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interpretation of the evidence is that there is herding:  The decision to build a hotel is made under 
great uncertainty about future demand, and relying on information inferred from other market 
participants’ actions is therefore tempting. 
There is a large body of theoretical work on herding.  In comparison, the empirical literature 
on herding is small.  The main reason are difficulties in obtaining data that allow for rigorous 
tests of hypotheses drawn from herding models.  Specifically, measuring the performance of an 
investment is hard if performance data is reported at the corporate level, not at the level of a 
particular investment.  Furthermore, there can be many different reasons for imitative behavior, 
and identifying such reasons is challenging.  Herding can arise if decisions must be made based 
on very unreliable information, but it can also be caused by career concerns (so the destruction of 
information is the goal).  Imitation can also be spurious, simply caused by information that is 
available to the market participants but not to researchers. 
Our data allow us to overcome many of these difficulties.  Unobserved positive information 
cannot be driving our findings, since investments made during the peak of a cycle underperform 
others.  Career concerns in connection with investment decisions are not an issue either, since the 
vast majority of investments into hotel developments is made by individuals, partnerships or 
LLCs.  Moreover, our performance measure is not aggregated over several investments, since we 
measure performance at the hotel level rather than at a more aggregate company level.  
Additionally, our data include important hotel and market characteristics that typically also affect 
performance, allowing us to control for factors that might confound with local and aggregate 
investment cycles. 
A theory vacuum remains, however.  We find significant and long-lasting underperformance 
by hotels built during a local investment boom, while early participants in these booms do not 
underperform others (except in the short run).  Traditional herding models cannot explain this 
result, since a standard assumption is that all participants in a “herd” earn identical payoffs.  The 
literature has made progress in relaxing assumptions and showing that herding and informational 
cascades are a robust feature in models of decision-making under uncertainty.
16
  Our findings 
suggest that models can be made more realistic by abandoning the assumption that all payoffs 
                                                 
16
 Relaxed assumptions include heterogeneously informed agents, costs of acquiring information, and endogenous 
entry; see Chamley and Gale, 1994; Zhang, 1997; Grenadier, 1999; Chari and Kehoe, 2004. 
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are identical.  We suggest one possibility: Building a hotel may be a good idea either because a 
local market (in our case a county) is promising overall, or because a particular site (within that 
county) is promising. If other participants cannot exactly identify why a hotel was just built, they 
may (wrongly) infer that the overall market is promising.
17
 
Clearly, there is still much to be learned about herding — in particular, given our results, 
why herders may underperform others.  It would also be interesting to study whether herding 
leads to underperformance in different settings (i.e., whether underperformance of herders is 
industry-specific or an empirical regularity).  An alternative way to look at this phenomenon is to 
empirically study how information is transmitted during herding/non-herding periods.  Perhaps a 
better understanding of how information is transmitted during herding periods will allow for 
better predictions in terms of market performance. 
  
                                                 
17
 The literature on herding in the investment management industry allows for payoff externalities, but they are 
positive.  Positive payoff externalities are also analyzed in Choi (1997).  Negative externalities within an optimal 
stopping game are analyzed in Frisell (2003).  Negative externalities are also analyzed in Ridley (2008), who studies 
when an uninformed firm imitates a better-informed competitor’s market entry decision (creating negative payoff 
externalities from competition), and how the competitor anticipates that and adapts her own entry decision. 
37 
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Supplemental Appendix: Quality Segment Subsamples  
In Table 3, we study the impact of Cohort Effect and Entrants on hotel performance for different 
subsamples according to hotel age.  Now, we replicate those estimations separately for different 
subgroups.  First, we divide our sample between branded and independent hotels.  Then, we 
further divide our sample of branded hotels into 3 categories: Upscale, Midscale and Economy.  
The first category contains hotels belonging to the 3 highest quality segments, namely Luxury, 
Upper Upscale and Upscale; the second category contains both types of Midscale hotels (with 
and without food and beverage); and the third category is simply the quality segment assigned to 
Economy hotels, the most frequent segment in our sample (see Table 1, Panel E).  
When estimating equation (3) separately for branded and independent hotels, and between 
quality segments, we would like to know the organizational form and brand under which hotels 
started their operations.  However, we only have information about their organizational form, 
brand and quality segment at the time of performance measurement and not at the time they were 
built. This distinction is unlikely to be of particular relevance when making our group 
classifications, for two reasons.  First, as mentioned in Section 2, management contracts and 
franchise agreements are usually long-term (about 20 years), with a high renewal rate.  Second, 
our data shows that the actual variation among these categories is low.  For example, in our 10 
years of performance data, the yearly rate of independent hotels turning into branded hotels was 
only 0.34%, and the yearly rate of branded hotels turning into independent hotels was similarly 
low: 0.42%.  
Replicating our baseline specification for different subgroups helps us  test some alternative 
explanations  for our findings.  For example, if agency problems have anything to do with our 
finding that a higher number of entrants in the same county-year have a negative and pervasive 
effect on hotels’ performance, then that effect should be much more pronounced for branded 
hotels than for independent hotels.  Similarly, one could postulate that the owners of the brands 
benefit from having a presence in all markets, even if some of these markets offer subpar 
returns.
18
  If this is the case, our results should be completely driven by branded hotels.   
                                                 
18
 Although we allow for this possibility, we believe it is not likely relevant, as construction decisions and brand 
choices are typically made by developers, not the owners of the brands. 
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Alternatively, underperformance of hotels built during local booms could be due to those 
hotels being built in cheaper and less attractive sites and thus lower operational performance was 
expected.  If that was the case, then the underperformance should be more pronounced for the 
Upscale hotels than for Economy hotels, as most Economy hotels are built in very homogenous 
sites (e.g., near a highway). 
Table A1 shows the results for branded hotels and Table A2 shows the results for 
independent hotels.  Our results show that Entrants have a pervasive negative effect on hotels’ 
performance, both in the branded and independent hotels subgroups.  The finding that Entrants is 
an important determinant of hotels’ performance for both subgroups helps us to eliminate agency 
considerations as driving our results, since independent hotels suffer at least as much as branded 
hotels from other hotels being built in the same year. This finding also mitigates the concern that 
our main results are driven by branded hotels accepting lower returns in some of their projects 
due to a national positioning strategy.  
 
Table A1: Cohort Effect and County-Level Entry by Hotel Age for Branded Hotels 
The table shows the results from our baseline empirical equation (3) for different subsamples based on hotels’ 
age, using performance data of hotels affiliated to a nationwide recognized brand.  The dependent variable in all 
columns is hotel performance log(RevPAR) in a given year t during 2000-2009.  The variables of interest are: 
Cohort Effect to capture the impact of the aggregate investment cycles and Entrants to capture the impact of 
local/county-level investment cycles.  Entrants is measured as the number of all hotels that entered the same county 
c in the same year h as a given hotel i.  Cohort Effect in all columns is our detrended measure (i.e.  the standardized 
residual from the time trend of the total number of hotels built in the US in year h, see Section 3.2).  We use all the 
control variables described in equation (3), but omit their coefficients to save space. In all regressions, robust 
standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and county-level clusters.  Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Hotel Age
"1-5" "6-10" "11-20" "21-30" ">30"
Variable log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR)
Cohort Effectih -0.0123*** 0.0004 0.0012 0.0014 -0.0116
(0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0045) (0.0085)
Entrantsich -0.0091*** -0.0052*** -0.0047*** -0.0052** 0.0088*
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0050)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Org. Form Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brand Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.6534 0.7262 0.6990 0.6998 0.6448
N 32,086 41,720 60,783 33,309 28,450  
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Table A2: Cohort Effect and County-Level Entry by Hotel Age for Independent Hotels 
The table shows the results from our baseline empirical equation (3) for different subsamples based on hotels’ 
age, using performance data of independent hotels (i.e, not affiliated to a nationwide recognized brand).  The 
dependent variable in all columns is hotel performance log(RevPAR) in a given year t during 2000-2009.  The 
variables of interest are: Cohort Effect to capture the impact of the aggregate investment cycles and Entrants to 
capture the impact of local/county-level investment cycles.  Entrants is measured as the number of all hotels that 
entered the same county c in the same year h as a given hotel i.  Cohort Effect in all columns is our detrended 
measure (i.e.  the standardized residual from the time trend of the total number of hotels built in the US in year h, 
see Section 3.2). We use all the control variables described in equation (3), but omit their coefficients to save space.  
In all regressions, robust standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and county-level clusters.  Significant at: 
*10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Hotel Age
"1-5" "6-10" "11-20" "21-30" ">30"
Variable log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR)
Cohort Effectih -0.0172 -0.0148 -0.0066 -0.0018 0.0045
(0.0137) (0.0107) (0.0122) (0.0153) (0.0186)
Entrantsich -0.0113** -0.0139** -0.0125* -0.0090* -0.0003
(0.0047) (0.0056) (0.0072) (0.0053) (0.0083)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Org. Form Fixed Effects No No No No No
Brand Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.5082 0.6057 0.4203 0.4244 0.4007
N 2,167 2,398 5,317 5,102 8,517  
 
Tables A3, A4 and A5 show the results for branded hotels in the Upscale, Midscale and 
Economy subgroups, respectively.  Our results show that additional Entrants in the same county-
year in which a given hotel was built lead to significant underperformance of that hotel for up to 
20 years for Upscale and Midscale hotels, and up to 30 years for Economy hotels.  We also find 
that the impact of Entrants on performance is at least as large for Economy hotels as for the other 
2 groups.  These results help to mitigate the concern that subpar performance is a mere 
consequence of building hotels in cheaper, less attractive sites, as Entrants impacts performance 
more negatively for Economy hotels, the quality segment where site selection is of lesser 
relevance.  
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Table A3: Cohort Effect and County-Level Entry by Hotel Age for Upscale Hotels 
The table shows the results from our baseline empirical equation (3) for different subsamples based on hotels’ 
age, using performance data of hotels affiliated to a nationwide recognized brand in any of the following segments: 
Upscale, Upper Upscale and Luxury. The dependent variable in all columns is hotel performance log(RevPAR) in a 
given year t during 2000-2009.  The variables of interest are: Cohort Effect to capture the impact of the aggregate 
investment cycles and Entrants to capture the impact of local/county-level investment cycles.  Entrants is measured 
as the number of all hotels that entered the same county c in the same year h as a given hotel i.  Cohort Effect in all 
columns is our detrended measure (i.e.  the standardized residual from the time trend of the total number of hotels 
built in the US in year h, see Section 3.2). We use all the control variables described in equation (3), but omit their 
coefficients to save space. In all regressions, robust standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and county-
level clusters.  Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Hotel Age
"1-5" "6-10" "11-20" "21-30" ">30"
Variable log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR)
Cohort Effectih -0.0104** 0.0000 -0.0027 0.0060 -0.0137
(0.0049) (0.0044) (0.0063) (0.0088) (0.0192)
Entrantsich -0.0079*** -0.0047*** -0.0038** -0.0012 0.0053
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0059)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Org. Form Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brand Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.6155 0.7289 0.6232 0.5925 0.6181
N 7,455 7,069 11,738 7,285 3,900  
 
Table A4: Cohort Effect and County-Level Entry by Hotel Age for Midscale Hotels 
The table shows the results from our baseline empirical equation (3) for different subsamples based on hotels’ 
age, using performance data of hotels affiliated to a nationwide recognized brand in the Midscale segments (with 
and without food and beverage). The dependent variable in all columns is hotel performance log(RevPAR) in a 
given year t during 2000-2009.  The variables of interest are: Cohort Effect to capture the impact of the aggregate 
investment cycles and Entrants to capture the impact of local/county-level investment cycles.  Entrants is measured 
as the number of all hotels that entered the same county c in the same year h as a given hotel i.  Cohort Effect in all 
columns is our detrended measure (i.e.  the standardized residual from the time trend of the total number of hotels 
built in the US in year h, see Section 3.2). We use all the control variables described in equation (3), but omit their 
coefficients to save space. In all regressions, robust standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and county-
level clusters.  Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
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Hotel Age
"1-5" "6-10" "11-20" "21-30" ">30"
Variable log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR)
Cohort Effectih -0.0146*** -0.0034 -0.0022 -0.0080 -0.0092
(0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0033) (0.0064) (0.0106)
Entrantsich -0.0089*** -0.0042** -0.0048** -0.0022 0.0148**
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0066)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Org. Form Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brand Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.3684 0.4852 0.4015 0.4205 0.4717
N 18,590 23,846 27,831 13,223 15,261  
 
Table A5: Cohort Effect and County-Level Entry by Hotel Age for Economy Hotels 
The table shows the results from our baseline empirical equation (3) for different subsamples based on hotels’ 
age, using performance data of hotels affiliated to a nationwide recognized brand in the Economy segment. The 
dependent variable in all columns is hotel performance log(RevPAR) in a given year t during 2000-2009.  The 
variables of interest are: Cohort Effect to capture the impact of the aggregate investment cycles and Entrants to 
capture the impact of local/county-level investment cycles.  Entrants is measured as the number of all hotels that 
entered the same county c in the same year h as a given hotel i.  Cohort Effect in all columns is our detrended 
measure (i.e.  the standardized residual from the time trend of the total number of hotels built in the US in year h, 
see Section 3.2). We use all the control variables described in equation (3), but omit their coefficients to save space. 
In all regressions, robust standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and county-level clusters.  Significant at: 
*10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Hotel Age
"1-5" "6-10" "11-20" "21-30" ">30"
Variable log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR) log(RevPAR)
Cohort Effectih -0.0075 0.0043 0.0101** 0.0053 -0.0146
(0.0074) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0069) (0.0128)
Entrantsich -0.0105*** -0.0066*** -0.0047* -0.0107*** 0.0034
(0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0056)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Org. Form Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brand Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.3354 0.3494 0.1891 0.2714 0.3363
N 6,990 11,913 23,700 15,360 12,876  
